reflexive banach space
Minimizing Regret on Reflexive Banach Spaces and Nash Equilibria in Continuous Zero-Sum Games
We study a general adversarial online learning problem, in which we are given a decision set X' in a reflexive Banach space X and a sequence of reward vectors in the dual space of X. At each iteration, we choose an action from X', based on the observed sequence of previous rewards. Our goal is to minimize regret, defined as the gap between the realized reward and the reward of the best fixed action in hindsight. Using results from infinite dimensional convex analysis, we generalize the method of Dual Averaging (or Follow the Regularized Leader) to our setting and obtain upper bounds on the worst-case regret that generalize many previous results. Under the assumption of uniformly continuous rewards, we obtain explicit regret bounds in a setting where the decision set is the set of probability distributions on a compact metric space S. Importantly, we make no convexity assumptions on either the set S or the reward functions. We also prove a general lower bound on the worst-case regret for any online algorithm. We then apply these results to the problem of learning in repeated two-player zero-sum games on compact metric spaces. In doing so, we first prove that if both players play a Hannan-consistent strategy, then with probability 1 the empirical distributions of play weakly converge to the set of Nash equilibria of the game. We then show that, under mild assumptions, Dual Averaging on the (infinite-dimensional) space of probability distributions indeed achieves Hannan-consistency.
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The best approximation pair problem relative to two subsets in a normed space
In the classical best approximation pair (BAP) problem, one is given two nonempty, closed, convex and disjoint subsets in a finite- or an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, and the goal is to find a pair of points, each from each subset, which realizes the distance between the subsets. We discuss the problem in more general normed spaces and with possibly non-convex subsets, and focus our attention on the issues of uniqueness and existence of the solution to the problem. As far as we know, these fundamental issues have not received much attention. We present several sufficient geometric conditions for the (at most) uniqueness of a BAP. These conditions are related to the structure and the relative orientation of the boundaries of the subsets and to the norm. We also present many sufficient conditions for the existence of a BAP. Our results significantly extend the horizon of a recent algorithm for solving the BAP problem [Censor, Mansour, Reem, J. Approx. Theory (2024)]. The paper also shows, perhaps for the first time, how wide is the scope of the BAP problem in terms of the scientific communities which are involved in it (frequently independently) and in terms of its applications.
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Minimizing Regret on Reflexive Banach Spaces and Nash Equilibria in Continuous Zero-Sum Games
We study a general adversarial online learning problem, in which we are given a decision set X in a reflexive Banach space X and a sequence of reward vectors in the dual space of X. At each iteration, we choose an action from X, based on the observed sequence of previous rewards. Our goal is to minimize regret. Using results from infinite dimensional convex analysis, we generalize the method of Dual Averaging to our setting and obtain upper bounds on the worst-case regret that generalize many previous results. Under the assumption of uniformly continuous rewards, we obtain explicit regret bounds in a setting where the decision set is the set of probability distributions on a compact metric space S. Importantly, we make no convexity assumptions on either S or the reward functions. We also prove a general lower bound on the worst-case regret for any online algorithm. We then apply these results to the problem of learning in repeated two-player zero-sum games on compact metric spaces. In doing so, we first prove that if both players play a Hannan-consistent strategy, then with probability 1 the empirical distributions of play weakly converge to the set of Nash equilibria of the game. We then show that, under mild assumptions, Dual Averaging on the (infinite-dimensional) space of probability distributions indeed achieves Hannan-consistency.
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Minimizing Regret on Reflexive Banach Spaces and Nash Equilibria in Continuous Zero-Sum Games
Balandat, Maximilian, Krichene, Walid, Tomlin, Claire, Bayen, Alexandre
We study a general adversarial online learning problem, in which we are given a decision set X' in a reflexive Banach space X and a sequence of reward vectors in the dual space of X. At each iteration, we choose an action from X', based on the observed sequence of previous rewards. Our goal is to minimize regret, defined as the gap between the realized reward and the reward of the best fixed action in hindsight. Using results from infinite dimensional convex analysis, we generalize the method of Dual Averaging (or Follow the Regularized Leader) to our setting and obtain upper bounds on the worst-case regret that generalize many previous results. Under the assumption of uniformly continuous rewards, we obtain explicit regret bounds in a setting where the decision set is the set of probability distributions on a compact metric space S. Importantly, we make no convexity assumptions on either the set S or the reward functions.
When is there a Representer Theorem? Reflexive Banach spaces
We consider a general regularised interpolation problem for learning a parameter vector from data. The well known representer theorem says that under certain conditions on the regulariser there exists a solution in the linear span of the data points. This is the core of kernel methods in machine learning as it makes the problem computationally tractable. Most literature deals only with sufficient conditions for representer theorems in Hilbert spaces. We prove necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of representer theorems in reflexive Banach spaces and illustrate why in a sense reflexivity is the minimal requirement on the function space. We further show that if the learning relies on the linear representer theorem the solution is independent of the regulariser and in fact determined by the function space alone. This in particular shows the value of generalising Hilbert space learning theory to Banach spaces.
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Minimizing Regret on Reflexive Banach Spaces and Nash Equilibria in Continuous Zero-Sum Games
Balandat, Maximilian, Krichene, Walid, Tomlin, Claire, Bayen, Alexandre
We study a general adversarial online learning problem, in which we are given a decision set X' in a reflexive Banach space X and a sequence of reward vectors in the dual space of X. At each iteration, we choose an action from X', based on the observed sequence of previous rewards. Our goal is to minimize regret, defined as the gap between the realized reward and the reward of the best fixed action in hindsight. Using results from infinite dimensional convex analysis, we generalize the method of Dual Averaging (or Follow the Regularized Leader) to our setting and obtain upper bounds on the worst-case regret that generalize many previous results. Under the assumption of uniformly continuous rewards, we obtain explicit regret bounds in a setting where the decision set is the set of probability distributions on a compact metric space S. Importantly, we make no convexity assumptions on either the set S or the reward functions. We also prove a general lower bound on the worst-case regret for any online algorithm. We then apply these results to the problem of learning in repeated two-player zero-sum games on compact metric spaces. In doing so, we first prove that if both players play a Hannan-consistent strategy, then with probability 1 the empirical distributions of play weakly converge to the set of Nash equilibria of the game. We then show that, under mild assumptions, Dual Averaging on the (infinite-dimensional) space of probability distributions indeed achieves Hannan-consistency.
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